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An initial investigation of the usability of fictional
conversation for doing conversation analysis
A. W. McHOUL
Ethnomethodology, conversation analysis and fictional texts
This paper proposes that fictional conversations be taken seriously as
objects for conversation analysis. It also goes some small way towards
exemplifying such an analysis. However, the field of ethnomethodology/
conversation analysis has not been exactly quick to embrace literary
materials to date, and it has been especially neglectful of fictional (literary
and dramatic) dialogue. Again seriously: one may wonder why this has
been the case.
There are certainly a few papers and books within the field which have
taken up literary materials in the broadest sense — or at least written
ones. Schenkein (1979) has examined a newspaper narrative, and Psathas
(1979) has considered directional maps. Anderson and Sharrock (1979)
took up the case of news reportage and attributions of 'bias' as well as
hospital direction signs (Sharrock and Anderson 1979). Anderson (1978a,
b) has studied plausibility features of social science texts, while O'Neill
(1981) has focused on the specifically literary features of natural and
social science writing. Additionally, McHoul (1982a, b) has given some
attention to the use of conversation analysis techniques in the handling of
fictional and news texts. Smith (1982) has attempted an 'integration' of
textual readings with the social 'contexts' of their location in her theory
and analysis of the 'active text'. Morrison (1976, 1981) has specifically
focused on 'telling order designs' in reading tests, popular histories, and
biology textbooks inter alia. Closer to the official mainline of ethnometho-
dology, Garfinkel et al. (1981) have examined everyday laboratory
procedures using both conversational and notebook material.
This list is not exhaustive, and a number of new studies are emerging
(for example, Lury 1982). However, we can note in this corpus a concern
with predominantly 'nonfictional' texts (news and social science reportage
particularly) and a desire — especially in Smith's paper — to tie textual
materials to concrete interactional affairs. It is almost as if one could gain
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the impression that fiction and its reading were in some peculiar way not
to count as everyday phenomena. In practice then, if not as an explicit
theoretical commitment, the hangover from interactionism's empiricist
preference for the face-to-face (as opposed to, say, the face-to-page)
dominates this corpus. With the exception of a single piece by Garnica
(1977), hardly any attempt has been made to examine the domain of
fictional conversation as a specific object of (or for) analysis; it should be
added that Garnica's paper, while partially repeating Schegloff 's (1968)
seminal work in summons-answer analysis, has its concerns more clearly
in the sphere of the psychosocial and the literary critical.
This state of affairs leads to a necessary questioning of what status the
fictional in general might (or might not) have as a furnisher of materials
for ethnomethodological and conversation-analytic investigations. I
have not seen any argument directly against their use and so must make
do in the following section of this paper with some conjectures about this
status and raise some responses in the (possibly misguided) anticipation
that they are close to the right ones.
The status of the fictional as an ethnomethodological object (or: My baby
has gone down the plughole)
No doubt one very simple reason for the neglect of fictional materials in
ethnomethodology generally and that of fictional conversation in conver-
sation analysis is that so-called 'naturally occurring', 'interactional',
'face-to-face' materials abound and are easily collected (though see
Schwartz and Jacobs 1979), and that a deal of accounting for spoken
discourse is yet to be done. As it were, this relatively new field, barely 20
years old, has its mainstream work cut out for it and pending.
Yet, as noted elsewhere (McHoul 1982: 1-10), ethnomethodology has
shown something of a distaste for — how can we put it? — the 'non-
actual', perhaps, while semiological investigations, for example, have
made little distinction between the analytic statuses of fictional and
nonfictional signs. Perhaps in its distrust of social science's 'constructive
theorizing' in, be it noted, textual formations, ethnomethodology has
asked for a return to the interactional things in themselves as opposed to
'free invention, constructive analytic theorizing, mock-ups, or book
reviews' (Garfinkel 1967: viii) — to repeat a by now infamous list.
Inherited from ethnomethodology's phenomenological parent, this meth-
odological preference for studies of Occasions' from 'within the setting
itself' has, to a certain extent, tended to spill over on to the nature of the
materials to be examined by that methodological interest. That is, written
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(and especially fictional) materials are written off as both theoretic
insights into and sources of 'empirical' materials deriving from the
everyday world. The initial 'bathwater' step may have some justification
under phenomenological auspices, but the latter, I prefer to think, rids us
of a potentially interesting 'baby'. Naturally, then, I have some concern to
do an emergency plumbing job — distasteful though it may be — and
possibly without guarantee of recovering a live specimen.
The opposition between fictional and actual materials has a long
history in Western philosophical discourse; this is no more clearly seen
than in the social sciences, where the nineteenth-century natural science
aversion to 'invented' data has lived on unabashed by the non-empirical
or quasi-empirical status of many modern physical and cosmological
objects — the black hole and the photon being cases in point. We must
suspect that ethnomethodology's aversion (if such it be) to the fictional
lies along the same route. But how defensible is that opposition?
The timbre of ethnomethodological appeals for naturally occurring
interactional materials is not unlike that of its sibling discourse, speech act
theory, which calls for analysis of 'serious' and 'non-invented' acts in the
first analysis. Austin (1962) made this explicit by creating a first and
second class of speech acts — the serious/literal/ordinary as opposed to
the frivolous/fictional/special:
a performative utterance will, for example, be in a peculiar way hollow or void if
said by an actor on a stage, or if introduced in a poem, or spoken in soliloquy.
This applies in a similar manner to any and every utterance — a sea-change in
special circumstances. Language in such circumstances is in special ways —
intelligibly — used not seriously, but in ways parasitic upon its normal use —
ways which fall under the etiolations of language. All this we are excluding from
consideration. (Austin 1962: 22)
With foreshadowings of Garfinkel, he adds: Our [sic] performative
utterances, felicitous or not, are to be understood as issued in ordinary
circumstances'.
Here there is no doubt a strong flavor of that division between the
language of artifice (fiction, drama, child's play) and that of 'real life'.
Indeed Searle (1977) has explicitly taken Austin's division to amount to
just that. Does it not seem a little peculiar that a given society should have
one sphere of its practice relegated to the 'unserious' while another
qualifies as 'real life'? Are we that certain of our ontological divisions that
we can, with any consensus, use the term 'real life' in any exclusive
fashion? In his reply to Searle, Derrida (1978) has very thoroughly
deconstructed such a division of linguistic acts with the full force of his
anti-logocentric philosophy. While he does not make the point, it would
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no doubt clarify the matter considerably were we to extend the case into
the anthropological domain. How certain could we be that a set of
practices Pt in an alien culture were its 'etiolated' cases while those of P2
were examples of 'real life'? This is a well-known anthropological
problem, endemic to reportage of certain practices as coming under the
category 'belief or 'religious belief where such a category may not have
ethno-epistemological validity. To take an example from Coulter (1979:
179), in a case like this we should have to consider how we characterized a
practice like 'making rain' vis-a-vis one like 'chopping wood': how are we
to divide with any certainty the Ordinary' practice (P2) from the 'make
believe' (Ρχ)? Clearly, no philosophical theory is yet available to us which
can exhaustively divide, say, the scientific from the ideological or the
economic from the cultural. Likewise, we rely on an unexplicated
commonsense esthetics in dividing 'real, serious' talk from 'invented,
fictional' talk.
Derrida (1978) has a number of important points to make in the same
direction in order to overcome what is, after all, only a peculiar moral and
metaphysical separation. In its place, he argues that there is only iteration
in general and that the specification of separate 'fictional' or 'standard'
cases thereof cannot be recommended on any strong grounds:
What would a so-called 'standard' promise or a statement be if it could not be
repeated or reproduced? If, for example (an example of iteration in general), it
could not be mimed or reproduced on the stage or, another example (my
emphasis, a different example), in a citation? (Derrida 1978: 231)
That is, our everyday lives are shot through with mimesis, repetition, and
citation of one sort or another. Sacks, for example, makes much of
utterances like 'He didn't even say hello' as materials pointing to the
native expectability of certain utterances in certain slots (Sacks n.d.: 26).
This is conversational data par excellence — but what is it if not a citation
(albeit of an absence)? The ethnomethodological topic of 'formulations'
(Heritage and Watson 1979, 1980; Garfinkel and Sacks 1970) is nothing if
not an indication of the fact that speakers continually cite and repeat
'what it is we are doing' with such and such a fragment of talk. 'Giving the
gist' would be a case of citationality/mimesis found in a routine setting.
More abstractly, insofar as there is 'no new thing', conversation (as well
as other discourse) is condemned in one sense to iterability. This is at least
one crucial aspect of Chomskian linguistic philosophy which has been lost
in the move toward situational pragmatics. No wonder that the obviously
citational (for instance, the dramatic use of talk) is a side show for
ethnomethodology, speech act theory, and linguistic pragmatics; it is a
reminder of this critical forgetting. As Derrida goes on to say:
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Parasitism does not need the theatre or literature to appear. Tied to iterability,
this possibility obtains constantly as we can verify at every moment, including this
one [AM: especially as I am quoting Derrida here]. A promise that could not be
reiterated ... a moment afterwards would not be a promise, and therein resides the
possibility of parasitism, even in what S[e]arl[e] calls 'real life'. (Derrida 1978: 232
— Nb. Derrida reduces 'Searle' to 'Sari', an acronym in French for the equivalent
of * Limited Company')
Thus a case of a promise in fiction cannot be a 'pretended' or 'mocked up'
one except insofar as 'real life' instances can also be 'parasitic', 'cited', or
repeated in some way. To this extent there is a mutual dependence
(Derrida: 'two fold roots') — but it is not one in which a secondary case of
language and a primary depend on each other so much as one in which
both cases depend upon a general and ineluctable iterability. The priority
granted to a metaphysically arbitrary 'real' set of discursive practices is
invalid and — more importantly — analytically limiting.
As a consequence, I would prefer to see ethnomethodology and
conversation analysis taking 'fictional' conversation seriously — as
seriously as anything else, for it is not logically, praxiologically, or
epistemologically separable from that 'anything else'. This is no more
plainly seen than in the irony that it is not talk but writing that
conversation analysis depends upon — if we apply the arbitrary division
just deconstructed. In the raw fact of the matter, conversation analysis
insists that talk be transcribed into writing — and this is not without its
transformative effects upon that talk. To get at the fine detail of, say,
overlapped tag-positioned address terms (Jefferson 1973), it is crucial that
the analyst read rather than hear them. Even in less acute cases, the
presentation of conversational materials in writing is crucial to their
public dissemination and membership in an official corpus.
In response, the more logocentric conversation analyst might note
that at least her materials are records of, mnemonics for, or representa-
tions of some things which human beings actually uttered. But what is this
'actually'? To write is certainly to utter; but who writes? The question, on
Derrida's thesis, is irrelevant. Both 'naturally occurring' and fictional
conversations are instances of a general iterability. They are, that is,
precisely able to be repeated. The positions of readers and writers as, for
example, psychological subjects, are irrelevant to this more general
possibility.
Perhaps the reader is more like a conversational overhearer — a non-
participating interloper. But in no sense that an empiricist realism can
provide are the characters in a fiction any more 'participants'. This
question of either psychological subject positions or functionalist 'roles' is
irrelevant to the case in hand. Ironically, while ethnomethodology and
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conversation analysis rely upon a world in which 'actual people'
interact, a theory of what is to count as 'actual' is never stated — it
remains an unexplicated commonsense resource. Somehow, we are ex-
pected to know — and we are expected to know that the category
'naturally' excludes the fictional. Yet in a crucial sense nobody says:
Agnes: Where'djuh have dinner:: with them
Portia: hh Oh, we went down tuh, Ravma
(Sacks 1970: 1)
any more than anybody says 'Longtempsje me suis couche de bonne heure'
(Proust 1954: 45) or 'Ah! mon vieil ami, quel bonheur de se promener
ensemble par ce beau temps!' (Proust 1955: 56-57), the latter being a case
of 'direct' speech. The names 'Agnes', 'Portia', 'Proust', 'Marcel', and
'Swann' are themselves instances of a general iterability, not to be
privleged as authorial or characterological subjects to which these iterata
only and necessarily apply.
Of all the conversation analysts, Harvey Sacks was perhaps the most
insistent on the use of transcriptions of actual talk as opposed to any
'imagined conversational fragment' (Sacks 1971, cited in Jefferson 1981:
6). At the same time, his interest in 'actual talk' appears grossly incidental:
my research is about conversation only in this incidental way, that conversation is
something that we can get the actual happenings of on tape and transcribe them
more or less, i.e., conversation is simply something to begin with. (Sacks 1968,
cited in Jefferson 1981: 6)
It is the 'actual happenings' that are the crux of the matter for Sacks, not
the conversation as such. In a parallel way we could say, after Derrida,
that fictional talk is also an equally 'actual' happening insofar as it
constitutes a trace of a culture's iteration machinery; that, in fact, 'the
actual' is no longer a defensible category. There appears to be every good
reason, then, why fictional talk is, equally, simply something to begin
with.
The nature of the materials
It could be claimed that transcriptions of so-called 'actual' talk can
contain production features and details omitted from the unduly 'clean'
presentation of talk in fiction. Certainly, I have no instance in my
materials of, for example, overlapped talk in which both beginnings and
endings of overlap are clearly marked — as per bracket notation in
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conversation analysis. But, as I hope to show, fiction has its equivalents
for a deal of transcription conventions and, in addition, affords a range of
productional features unavailable from transcripts. The following outline
follows the detailed explanation of tape transcription notation to be
found in Schenkein (1978: xi-xvi), based on Jefferson's system — now
widely accepted in conversation analysis.
1. Simultaneous utterances
The dramatic text has several devices for indicating simultaneity. The
stage direction is but one:
(1.1) Pozzo: Help me!
Estragon: Wait!
Vladimir: Wait!
Pozzo: Wait!
All three take off their hats simultaneously, press their hands to their
foreheads, concentrate. (Beckett 1968: 41)
Alternatively, a collective name may be used to indicate the speaker(s):
(1.2) Enter Brutus and Cassius, with the Plebians
Citizens: We will be satisfied! Let us be satisfied.
(Shakespeare 1970: 985)
Prose fiction has its equivalent in which simultaneous utterances are
simply noted as such in accompanying text.
2. Overlapping utterances
As noted above, precise overlap starts and ends are unlikely to be found
together in fiction. More usually the overlap's start is given followed by
ellipsis to mark the possible continuation of 'something' and the next
speaker's utterance, assumed to be overlapping:
(2.1) The moonlight on the ripples of the water, the ...'
'Yes/ said Thorpe, 'but I'm not really interested in the r-r-r-ripples as
such, reflected lights and all that racket.... (Peake 1972: 87)
The ellipsis, as we shall see, is ambiguous in this respect, for it could
equally mark an abrupt cut-off — the general category which it marks,
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that of 'interruption' (in fiction), encompassing both overlap and cut-off
(in transcripts). There are, however, less ambiguous ways of marking
overlap; for example, with double ellipses:
(2.2) 'here's to God Almighty who allus sends us a good harvest...'
'Amen/ whispered Mrs Dogtrees.
'... and my daily drop,' he added. (Coppard 1974a: 174)
Dramatic texts may use exactly the same device, or else give more general
indications of talk to be overlapped, occasionally with sequencing
instructions, as in the following:
(2.3) During Lucky's tirade the others react as follows: (1) Vladimir and Estragon
all attention, Pozzo dejected and disgusted. (2) Vladimir and Estragon begin
to protest, Pozzo's sufferings increase. (3) Vladimir and Estragon attention
again, Pozzo more agitated and groaning. (4) Vladimir and Estragon protest
violently. Pozzo jumps up, pulls on the rope. General outcry. Lucky pulls on
the rope, staggers, shouts his text. All three throw themselves on Lucky who
struggles and shouts his text. (Beckett 1968: 42)
3. Contiguous utterances
'Latching' (absence of inter-turn pause) has its dramatic equivalent in
stichomythia, rapid One line' exchanges. As in taped transcripts, one
place where latching crops up is in sentence completions by next speakers:
(3.1) 1 Judge: Let that offender —
Duchess: Live, and be in health
1 Judge: Be on a scaffold —
Duke: Hold, hold, my lord
(Tourneur 1971: 13)
Here the long dash and the typographical location of the next utterance at
the end of the first line gives the effect of contiguity. In prose fiction,
contiguity may be marked as a rapidity effect, for example by the removal
of speaker designations ('she said ...' etc.) over a stretch of talk:
(3.2) 'Did I? How surprising*.
'What do you mean, chief?'
'What do you mean, sailor?'
Ί mean I've done it'.
(Peake 1972: 150)
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4. Intervals within and between utterances
Precise (to a tenth of a second) timings of inter- and intra-turn pause are
rare (if not totally absent) in prose and dramatic fiction, but the item
'pause', once used in conversational transcripts and presumably borrowed
from drama, is readily in evidence to mark intra-turn cases. 'Silence' is
more common for inter-turn pauses:
(4.1) Vladimir: Let us not waste our time in idle discourse!
(Pause. Vehemently.) Let us do something, while we have the
chance.
(Beckett 1968: 79)
(4.2) Vladimir: (alarmed). Mr Pozzo! Come back! We won't hurt you!
Silence
Estragon: We might try him with other names.
(Beckett 1968: 83)
Prose fiction is often able to give more detail of pause timings than the
general indications of dramatic texts:
(4.3)
 4You are still hard at work, I see?'
After a long silence the head was lifted for another moment, and the
voice replied, 'Yes — I am working'. (Dickens n.d. [1859]: 35)
Notice also the long dash to show intra-turn pause.
5. Characteristics of speech delivery
The equivalent of the transcriber's 'stop' can be got in numerous
typographical ways to indicate stopping falls. For example:
(5.1) When at last she spoke she brought out each separate word as though it
were a thing on its own, self-sufficient and divorced from the other words
in the sentence -'I ... have ... no ... intention ... of ... sharing ... the ...
vehicle ... with ... Miss ... George. It... appears ... that ... she ... has ...
done ... very ... well for ... herself, /... order ... the carriage — but... she
... squats ... in ... it. However ... she ... can ... pay ... for ... it.' (Peake
1972: 22)
Continuous intonation is presumably indicated in the above case by the
absence of inter-turn ellipsis, such as 'herself, /'. It is also displayed by
absence of punctuation in such examples as Molly Bloom's soliloquy
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(Joyce 1969: 659-704) and Lucky's tirade (Beckett 1968: 42-45):
(5.2) I resume alas alas on on in short in fine on on abode of stones who can
doubt it I resume but not so fast I resume the skull to shrink and waste and
concurrently simultaneously what is more.... (Beckett 1968: 44)
In fiction, also, single words may be run together to show continuity —
see example (5.4) below ('threethirty') and the uses of the device in poetry:
(5.3) The buspeople, and therewere many of
them, were shockedandsurprised and amused-
andannoyed.... (McGough in Henri et al. 1967: 69)
The extension of syllables^ shown by colons in tape transcripts, is found in
fiction by the prolongation of the syllabic symbol itself:
(5.4) ... same ... same ... my own face white in mirror three threethirty four
march of the Hours clock ticking room no can't go in no not enough light
not enough no aaahhh — (Pynchon 1973: 152)
(5.5) 'Na-a-y,' said Old Martin, with an elongation of the word, meant to
make it bitter as well as negative.... (Eliot n.d. [1859]: 369)
The comic book has well-known devices of this type (see Sacks et al. 1974:
734), often of a highly graphic nature such as very large format lettering
and the invention of such items as:
(5.6) [Pa Bear, on being blasted by Hank's shotgun:] Υ E A R G H ! (Beano
1973: no page numbers)
Again, well-placed ellipses can do the same work (in, be it noted, different
— intra-turn — positions from cut-off and overlap types):
(5.7)
 4Sh... sh... ladies!' Mr Pye hissed at them gently, and frowned with one
eyebrow up and down. (Peake 1972: 86)
The question mark, in fiction, routinely marks the grammatical interroga-
tive. Yet the first utterance of 4.3 above shows that it may also add a
questioning tone to a grammatical declarative — while Fu's first turn in
the instance below shows that it is not constant as an interrogative
marker:
(5.8) Ί didn't. Your interest in her is purely Platonic, is that it.'
vWha,' said Pig.
4No screwing,' Fu explained
(Pynchon 1975: 130 — Nb: whether Pig's 'Wha' is interrogative or not is a
matter of considerable literary dispute.)
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The exclamation point is an identical mark in transcript and fictional
symbolism, the former presumably deriving from the latter. The cut-off
can also be shown by ellipsis and, to this extent, is ambiguous vis-a-vis
overlap. In some cases, the problem is solved by the cut-off occurring in
mid-word ('Wha'?):
(5.9) Ί couldn't care less.'
'But this may actua—'
To hell with them both!'
This may actually help them,' Major Danby persisted stubbornly.
(Heller 1974: 476)
Conversational and fictional conventions share a similar usage of
underlining/italics for stress markers:
(5.10) That's the only thing you could bloody well do,' said Tintagieu. (Peake
1972: 69)
(5.11) everything's been done — I t-tell you; everything's been DONE.' (Peake
1972: 69)
Additionally, dramatic and prose fiction have a large range of features for
describing the kinds of tone employed in talk. The transcriptionist's
'quiet' sign, the degree (°), is accomplished straightforwardly:
(5.12) 'What splendid pain!' he whispered. 'What splendid pain!' (Peake 1972:
44)
Here the combination of T and 'whispered' produce a very obvious
(hearable) effect of quiet speech production without any subdued or 'held
back' overtones. One page of Shaw's Pygmalion displays the array of
tones that can be got by the fictional equivalent of transcriber's comments:
(5.13) [coming back into the room as if her question were the very climax of
unreason]
[shocked and hurt]
[now deeply wounded]
[very sulky]
[He turns on his heel and is about to go into extreme dudgeon]
[drinking in his emotion like nectar, and nagging him to provoke a further
supply]
[furious]
(Shaw 1972: 108)
Apart from speech production, interactional 'events' can also be marked
in the same way:
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(5.13) [she takes off her jewels]
[taking off a ring]
[Higgins dashes the ring violently into the fireplace, and turns on her so
threateningly that she crouches over the piano with her hands over her
face and exclaims,]
(Shaw 1972: 108-109)
The wealth of detail available in prose fiction need hardly be given in this
place.
6. Transcriptionist doubt
Needless to say, this is unlikely to be a fictional device, since fictional texts
are, inter alia, constituted by what is said. However, one character's
uncertainty over another's remark may be marked in fiction — a
meticulous play on such a possibility of multiple hearings is analyzed in
the next section of this paper. The device 'He said something that sounded
like "Porridge"' (or indeed: 'He said something that sounded like
porridge') is also obviously available in fictional reportage. One closer
approximation to the transcriber's attempt to furnish the gist of what is
said, without having the actual words available, is fiction's usage of
indirect speech in a passage of predominantly direct speech:
(6.1) 'So before the day came we were able to make the acquaintance of Dolly's
people, which we had not yet done.'
Margaret asked who Dolly's people were.
Tussell. The father is in the Indian army — retired ...
(Forster 1972: 67)
7. Additional features
In addition to encompassing the variety of productional markers used in
transcript notation, fictional talk has a number of its own characteristics
unavailable to, or not currently popular with, transcribers. Goodwin
(1979) and Heath (1982) are beginning to expand transcripts so that they
might encompass a variety of gestural, proxemic, and paralinguistic
('coenetic' [Kendon 1979]) material — notably gaze direction and its
shifts in relation to talk. Such features have traditionally been part of the
fictional corpus. For example, fictional talk routinely carries information
on the exact addressee of each utterance or part utterance either by means
of explicit mention or by working via gaze direction:
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(7.1) Odysseus of the nimble wits gave him [Irus] a black look. 'Sir', he replied, Ί
have neither said nor done a thing to hurt you....
(Homer 1971: 276)
Indeed, absence of gaze in two-party talk can also be marked for its
particular effectivity (avoidance and such):
(7.2) Tve never heard any old tales of this house; have you?'
The servant went on meticulously folding up the white tablecloth, and
without giving me a glance, said: 'No, Miss'.
(Coppard 1974b: 224)
Goodwin's (1979) work in conversational interaction has had as one of its
interests the use of gaze-direction in turn-management and recipiency.
Fictional talk is not without its devices for marking such interactional
work. Note how, in (7.3) below, Galadriel uses a current-speaker-
continues technique (Sacks et al. 1974) at a potential turn-transition place
and has it both seen and heard that the talk, from that point, is designed
for a new recipient:
(7.3) But if hope should not fail, then I say to you, Gimli son of Gloin, that your
hands shall flow with gold, and yet over you gold shall have no dominion.
'And you, Ring-bearer', she said turning to Frodo.
(Tolkien 1973: 393)
Anyone interested in the extended analysis of gaze in fictional talk might
turn to the rich seam of data in Chapter 29 of Bleak House (Dickens n.d.
[1853]: 382-391).
The orientations of speakers to one another are often quite explicit and
reflexively bound to the talk:
(7.4) Mr Pye was all attention. He leaned far forward over the railings, his whole
attention focused upon the major. His head was slightly upon one side as
though to assist his hearing. Nothing could be more flattering to Major
Havershot than to find himself commanding such complete attention. But
his satisfaction on this score was short lived.
4My friend,' said Mr Pye ...
(Peake 1972: 193)
More generally, the interactive demeanor of conversational participants
can receive quite detailed attention, such that we can subsequently
discover how to read their utterances off:
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(7.5) She looked an old woman, but was young. Her manner was one of
passionate grief; by turns she clasped her veinous and knotted hands
together with wild energy, and laid one of them on the carriage-door —
tenderly, caressingly, as if it had been a human breast, and could be
expected to feel the appealing touch.
'Monseigneur, hear me! Monseigneur, hear my petition ...
(Dickens n.d. [1859]: 113)
A further feature — the last to be mentioned here, although the list is by
no means exhaustive — of fictional talk which transcripts must omit is
this: that it affords the possibility of unspoken talk — so-called 'interior
monologue'. 'Unspoken talk' is probably more satisfactory in such
instances following Ryle's (1949) succinct deconstruction of the language/
thought dichotomy, and given the tendency of fiction to insert unspoken
fragments into conversational episodes (as well as, that is, attributing
them to 'solitary' characters). The dramatic aside is one technique by
which the unspoken is conventionally made bearable; but prose fiction
has its means of handling the phenomenon also. In some cases, its
inclusion can have important consequences for the analysis of conversa-
tional interaction. For example:
(7.6) 'Will Jenny be here soon? Where is she?'
The woman had a great desire to answer, but the man, with another
oath, openly kicked at her foot with his heavy boot.
(Dickens n.d. [1853]: 741)
Given only the 'talk', we would be faced with the problem of a first pair-
part question requiring, but not actually receiving, its concomitant second
pair-part answer. Question-Oath is a little peculiar, perhaps. The fictional
example nicely shows that even where second parts are not forthcoming
there is a strong orientation of conversational participants towards the
expectancy of them. The empirical evidence of transcripts cannot over-
turn a rule or orientation-to-a-rule even where its surface phenomena
appear to show a 'breach'. But at times the transcript itself may be a weak
source of evidence for the orientation, too. Fictional talk, with its possible
blend of 'interior' and 'exterior' talk, quite plainly is a stronger source in
such cases for displaying a culture's conversational orientations.
An analytic example
Consider the following fragment from the opening of Mervyn Peake's
novel, Mr Pye:
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(8.1) 'SARK'
'Yes, sir', said the man in the little quayside hut. Ά return fare. Six
shillings'.
Ά single, my friend', said Mr Harold Pye.
The man in the little hut looked up and frowned at the unfamiliar face.
'Did you say a "single", sir?'
Ί believe so'.
The man in the hut frowned again as though he were still not satisfied.
Why should this fat little stranger be so sure he wanted a 'single'? He was
obviously only a visitor. A return ticket would last him for three months
and would save him two shillings. Some people, he reflected, were beyond
hope. (Peake 1972: 7-8)
This small interactional episode is of quite important sociological poten-
tial. It represents an instance of a common ethno-political encounter. By
'ethno-political', I intend the realm of everyday or commonsense politics
in a culture (as in 'ethno-botany', 'ethno-science', etc.). For us, predomi-
nant ethno-political concerns are: Who gets to go where and by what
means may they be prevented or allowed to pass? How are credentials to
be presented in such encounters? What counts as a credential? Entrance to
schools, universities, hospitals, library collections, and other 'reserved'
institutions are cases in point. But so are the less obviously 'institutional'
cases such as access to esoteric communities; in this case, to a small island
community in the English Channel. The interactive moments at which
such questions occur might be called 'gatekeeping episodes'. In the
present case, bonafide, recognizable, reportable and, no doubt, countable
residents are the legitimate purchasers of single fares. Those who are
Obviously only' visitors and tourists are the equally legitimate purchasers
of returns. Official law does not come into it. The island is part of Great
Britain (though not of the United Kingdom) and so passports and other
official gatekeeping paraphernalia are not in order. However, the sale of
singles versus returns manages a variety of ethno-policing and ensures at
least a surveillance of those likely to turn a visit into an attempt at
residence. The tickets stand as tokens not for any freely willed or chosen
status but for a definite and visible one. That is, to borrow the
functionalist's jargon, resident/non-resident is an ethno-politically as-
cribed status.
What then of Mr Pye? He is essentially attempting to bring off his
position as an achieved one. He is directly flouting the routine gatekeep-
ing procedure. Ethno-politically, his interactive strategy is a subversive
one. The ticket-vendor's reality is so entrenched that he cannot see Pye's
strategy as a possible one: Mr Pye, for him, is visibly Only a visitor'; he
cannot change his status at will, by fiat; a single fare is in his own best
Brought to you by | Murdoch University Library (Murdoch University Library)
Authenticated | 172.16.1.226
Download Date | 7/17/12 6:44 AM98 A. W. McHoul
pecuniary interest; his request is merely an incompetence, a mistake of an
economic kind. How does Mr Pye bring the encounter off then? How does
he get the boot of accusation/incompetence onto the other foot? It is here
that we must examine his conversational strategy.
Given that the two interlocutors have, as we have noticed, discrepant
and mutually exclusive definitions of what the encounter essentially is,
there arises, in effect, a negotiation of blame. For the ticket-vendor's
version, Mr Pye is to blame (false status). For Mr Pye the ticket-vendor is
to blame (denied access). The question is, which is to be brought off
interactionally and pragmatically? The outcome decides the blame and
the dominant definition of what the encounter was all along. It decides it
retrospectively. Thus the talk goes to make up 'what the talk will have
been'. All this in accord with GarfinkeFs (1967: 76-103) work on the
documentary method. The problem for the participants is this: which can
be brought off as the most blameworthy — that a non-resident should
simply 'request' a residential privilege via the purchase of a single fare or
that a ticket-vendor and 'servant' of purchasers should presume to advise
a customer's 'free choice' of tickets? Blame, as Drew (1978) has shown, is
an eminently negotiable matter where competing accounts are in train.
In the conversation in (8.1), the negotiation of blame is not to be found
directly in the topic of conversation. It carries on at the presuppositional
level, where the matter of 'purchases' stands proxy for it. Firstly, we can
notice that the elliptical request, 'SARK', produces as a second pair-part
a request-acceptance, but that that acceptance carries a modulation, a
condition based on the presupposition that 'SARK' is to be (and can only
be) unpacked as, for example, Ά return ticket to Sark, please'.
In performing a correction, not of the prior utterance so much as of the
presupposition involved in the hearing of 'SARK', Mr Pye brings the
blame negotiation closer to the fore: Ά single, my friend'. Someone now,
at least, stands accused of having got something wrong: not just an
utterance but a whole political philosophy.
We can notice here that the blaming is in the form of a challenge to the
presupposition. The challenge is a marked form in that it cuts across the
strong conversational preference (Schegloff et al. 1977) for discoverers of
errors to allow the initial utterers of them to do a self-correction.
Purchasing a single now becomes a challengeable. That is, Mr Pye's
version of the presupposition is that it is a non-natural one in Putnam's
sense (see Coulter 1979: 176). That is, request-for-a-single and resident
status do not go together, for Mr Pye, as do for example predications of
'natural' classes like gold, light, and water. They are, for him, amenable to
revision. The reverse is true for the ticket-vendor.
The challenge, however, also manages a distinct effectivity by the
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addition of the tag-positioned address-term, 'my friend'. The utterance
form [CHALLENGE + FRIENDSHIP] works disjunctively insofar as
the membership category 'friends' (to which the ticket-vendor has by no
means subscribed) does not routinely carry with it a category-bound
activity like challenging (see Sacks 1972 on these matters). 'Friends' more
routinely carries with it 'support' and reliance on shared presuppositions.
The ticket-vendor has a number of possibilities open to him in this
position. He can take the disjunction [CHALLENGE + FRIENDSHIP]
as either (a) a way of modulating the challenge and so downgrading it or
(b) a way of amplifying the challenge via the addition of an ironically
placed membership category. In a parallel way, we can read a news
headline like
(8.2) KILLER NUNS
as modulating (toning down) acts of murder or as amplifying the
aggression of a traditionally 'tame' profession.
The ticket-vendor, in fact, proceeds by a counter-challenge to Pye's
with 'Did you say a "single", sir?' Note that the address-term, 'sir',
displays a non-acceptance of co-membership in the category 'friends' —
friends not normally being ones to use formal addresses and 'sir' being a
member of the device commonly used in 'business' exchanges. Interest-
ingly, 'sir', 'madam', etc., do not routinely have paired co-class terms, so
that in sales exchanges we routinely get the following types with [SIR + 0]:
A: Can I help you, sir?
B: Yes, I'm looking for a shirt.
The effect, then, of the ticket-vendor using this format here is to neutralize
or retrospectively cancel the applicability of the 'friends' device as a literal
usage. It is plainly hearing (b), above, that has been made — and the
vendor displays this.
The interrogative 'Did you say a "single" ...?' also leaves open two
hearings. It can gloss 'Do you really want a single?' or 'Were those in fact
your exact words?' The passage of unspoken talk by the vendor at the end
of (8.1) (beginning The man in the hut...') shows clearly that his question
is of the first type — his disbelief is focused upon any non-resident wanting
a single fare, not upon the veridicality of the words Ά single' having been
just uttered in the prior turn. That is, the utterance is framed as a genuine
query and not as an initiation of a correction (Schegloff et al. 1977).
Mr Pye, given this interpretive scope and given, no doubt, his version of
the encounter as one in which residency is achievable, does not hear it as a
query of the fact but as an initiation of a correction. As a next turn, then,
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he issues a rejection of the initiation (as opposed to, say, doing a self-
correction like 'Sorry, I meant to say a "return"'). The way in which he
frames this is interesting and interactionally significant, as we shall see.
Coulter (1979: 178) has noted that:
the ascription of belief to someone who makes a knowledge-claim bearably
downgrades that knowledge-claim and articulates an asymmetry between the
ascriber and the person to whom belief is being ascribed. Belief-ascription can be a
method of expressing one's reservations about the truth-value of someone's
assertions.
In Mr Pye's case, it is in fact his own prior claim ('a single') that is
potentially so downgraded by Ί believe so'. Hence he is able to generate a
high degree of irony. That is, it is literally impossible for him to be
mistaken about his having just said such-and-such. Matters like 'what I
just said', 'that this is my hand', 'that I have never been on the moon' and
so on are ones which Wittgenstein (1974) showed to be beyond the limits
of both doubt and knowledge. It is as absurd to say we know them (as
Moore claimed to) as it is to say we can doubt them. Any claim to know
or to doubt is, ipso facto, nonsensical in such cases.
In this way — relying upon a more deeply seated commonsense
foundation than the 'naturalness' of residency's collocation with single
tickets — Mr Pye nicely rules out the ticket vendor's prior query/correc-
tion initiation. It becomes an absurdity for him to have said anything else
and, by extension, so does the alternative reading of the interrogative (as
query about Pye's wants rather than his words). Pye's reply neatly folds
both under the same umbrella and provides him with the success he wants
from this gatekeeping encounter. It is by such a set of skillful conversa-
tional moves that he is able to bring off his 'definition' of the encounter as
the pragmatically justifiable one: he gets his single ticket. As it turns out,
Mr Pye does not leave Sark — this much is clear from the very beginning
of the novel.
Conclusion
Our inspection of the nature of conversational materials in fiction showed
them to be no less adequate for conversational analysis than tape
transcripts. The analytic example has, it is to be hoped, shown that a
number of conversation analysis's investigables can be drawn from this
rich source. At least the following appear to be open to us from this first
and necessarily truncated attempt:
— reflexive and documentary methods of talk construction
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— blame negotiations
— initiation/correction and their relation to presupposition
— selection of multiple hearings
— display of selected hearings
— use of (disjunctive) membership categorization devices
— challenging and counter-challenging
— paired utterances generally and their sequential organization
— literal versus ironic formations
— self-ascription of 'belief (and relation to 'unshakable' presupposi-
tions)
In addition, we can note that our fictive example also extends conversa-
tional-analytic investigations into areas of traditional sociological con-
cern — in this case into the ethno-politics of gatekeeping. To the extent
that such an analysis can be successful, we ought perhaps to hear less
from theorists about discrete domains of, for example, micro- and macro-
sociologies. Plainly there are reflexive relations between generally and
culturally embedded 'background expectancies' and the precise moves
and negotiations of actual encounters. A moral/methodological prefer-
ence for one over the other may run the risk of overlooking political or
interactional features. Indeed, the two seem inseparable.
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